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Recovery or stagnation?: Britain’s older industrial towns since
the recession
Christina Beattya and Steve Fothergillb
ABSTRACT
Britain’s older industrial towns have long been known to face economic problems. However, in the aftermath of the
recession triggered by the 2008 financial crisis, recorded unemployment in the towns has fallen to relatively low levels.
This paper deploys labour market accounts to measure the contributions of changing levels of employment, population,
national and international migration, commuting, and labour market participation to the pattern of change in the
towns in the period 2010–16. It also places older industrial towns in their regional context by comparing recent trends
in the towns with those in the main regional cities, London and the UK as a whole. The paper concludes that the
reduction in recorded unemployment since 2010 paints an overly positive picture of labour market trends in Britain’s
older industrial towns.
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INTRODUCTION
The recession triggered by the 2008 financial crisis was a
profound shock to the global economy, but nearly a decade
on it can seem like history. Economic growth returned after
a couple of years, and while growth has been unspectacular
in most countries, pre-recession levels of output have nearly
everywhere been overtaken and unemployment has fallen.
In the UK, the focus of the present paper, the growth in
productivity has been unusually slow and real wages have
fallen, but recorded unemployment is well down on peak
levels during the recession.
However, in the UK and elsewhere, the recession and
subsequent recovery were overlain on pre-existing regional
and local differences in prosperity. The trajectory of Brit-
ain’s older industrial towns is of particular interest. They
have a long history of economic problems, rooted in the
decline of the mining and manufacturing industries that
underpinned their original growth, and they entered the
2008 recession with fragile economies, lagging behind
the prosperity of London and its hinterland. Recent trends
in these towns is an unexplored area, with the commentary
having so far progressed little beyond the observation that
unemployment has fallen. There has also been little
attempt so far to place the trends in older industrial
towns within their wider regional context, which is
especially important now that labour markets in a phys-
ically small country such as the UK spill over from one
place to another as a result of large commuting and
migration flows. Yet, the economic trajectory of older
industrial towns has the potential to shed a light on
whether job loss is ultimately self-correcting, through
market mechanisms and a modicum of public interven-
tion, or whether it triggers ongoing cycles of local econ-
omic decline.
The answer to this question probably matters more than
ever because there is clear evidence of a political backlash in
Britain and elsewhere from ‘the places that don’t matter’
(Rodriguez-Pose, 2017). In the 2016 UK referendum on
European Union (EU) membership, for example, the
older industrial towns of England and Wales were
among the places that voted heavily for Brexit, a develop-
ment that has been widely interpreted as a symptom of dis-
illusion with globalization and deindustrialization and was
one of the reasons why, in spring 2019, the UK govern-
ment announced the establishment of a ‘Stronger Towns
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Fund’ targeted specifically at less prosperous local econom-
ies beyond the big cities.
Britain is far from alone in having swathes of the
country that have lost their original industrial base. Parts
of North East France, much of the former East Germany
and the ‘rustbelt’ of the United States come to mind. In
Britain both the original industrialization and the later
deindustrialization generally began earlier and the efforts
to rebuild economies have mostly been in place longer,
but the scale of the industrial job loss is often not dissimilar
to that found elsewhere. The statistical evidence points to
the UK as being one of the most regionally unbalanced
countries in the industrialized world (McCann, 2019),
but there may be international pointers in the recent British
experience.
AIMS OF THE RESEARCH
The present paper provides an empirical investigation of
trends in the labour market in Britain’s older industrial
towns between 2010 and 2016, in particular by deploying
‘labour market accounts’ to document the contributions
of changing levels of employment, population, migration,
commuting and labour market participation to the outcome
in terms of unemployment. It seeks to answer four key
questions.
. Does the reduction in recorded unemployment in Brit-
ain’s older industrial towns reflect a resurgence in local
job opportunities or have other important labour market
adjustments been at work?
. How do recent labour market trends in these older
industrial towns compare with trends in the main
regional cities, including London?
. To what extent is there systematic variation in the extent
to which the towns have recovered, for example, by
region or according to proximity to one of the main
regional cities?
. How have the recent labour market trends in Britain’s
older industrial towns been linked to trends in other
places by commuting and migration, including
migration from outside the UK?
In the broadest terms, the evidence assembled here is
intended to shed a light on whether recent trends suggest
there is a viable independent future for the economies of
Britain’s older industrial towns and, by inference, for
towns in other countries affected by industrial job loss.
What is novel in this contribution to economic geography
is that it provides new statistical evidence on the contem-
porary labour market in the advanced industrial economy
– and more specifically in its older industrial towns – that
has for good or ill probably led the world in
deindustrialization.
BRITAIN’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL TOWNS
The distinction between ‘towns’ and ‘cities’ is important
because although the UK’s main regional cities nearly all
have a strong industrial past, they have always played a
wider role in regional and local economies. They have
long been service centres for their hinterlands, administra-
tive headquarters, transport hubs for their regions and
home to major universities. On the whole, the economies
of the big regional cities were therefore never quite as reli-
ant on the older industries that have now shrunk or
disappeared.
A further reason for drawing the distinction between
‘towns’ and ‘cities’ is that in recent years towns have tended
to be out of favour in policy-making and academic debate.
Instead, the focus has been on cities and their potential to
lead economic growth. The dominant assumption has been
that cities benefit from agglomeration economies that make
them better locations for economic activity. If, exploiting
this inherent locational advantage, the economy of the
cities can be made to grow, the further assumption is that
the numerous towns around them will then be carried
along in their wake. Prosperity will be spread from the cities
to neighbouring areas via commuting flows and through
the overspill of businesses to less congested locations, or
so the theory goes.
These ideas have academic roots going as far back as
Marshall (1890), who argued that industrial clusters
raise productivity through easier access to a large and
skilled workforce and specialized suppliers and custo-
mers. A century later, Porter (1990) deployed much the
same arguments to explain competitiveness, Krugman
(1991) stressed the agglomeration advantages of cities,
and Jacobs (1986) argued that it is cities, not nations,
that are the drivers of wealth. In the UK, the State of
the English Cities report (Parkinson et al., 2006) was
important in identifying the reversal of decades of decline
in English conurbations and the turnaround in London,
in particular, has been underlined by Martin, Gardiner,
and Tyler (2014). Unsurprisingly, Britain’s cities have
latched on to these ideas to argue that they are now the
motors of economic growth and should be prioritized
for investment (Core Cities, 2013), a view echoed by
the Centre for Cities (2015). They have found a receptive
audience in central government, which has placed an
increasing emphasis on ‘city deals’ and the devolution of
powers to city-regions (HM Government, 2011; Cabinet
Office, 2015; Sandford 2016).
Yet, the evidence that cities really are leading UK econ-
omic growth remains patchy. Fothergill and Houston
(2016) argued that whilst cities are potentially good
locations for some types of business activity, non-city
areas are better for others. In a physically small country
such as the UK, the distances are rarely large so the labour
market links between towns and cities are very real, as
Swinney, McDonald, and Ramuni (2018) have documen-
ted. However, whether the UK regional cities have a mon-
opoly on growth and high productivity has been contested
in the context of the North of England (Cox & Longlands,
2016). It is clear, nevertheless, that UK cities and towns are
diverging in terms of their population structure, with all the
consequences that may imply for long-term growth (Centre
for Towns, 2017).
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In practice, the employment trends in the big cities
beyond London, at least up to 2012, seem not to have
been consistently better than elsewhere (Champion &
Townsend, 2011, 2013). Casting the net wider to include
smaller cities as well, Pike et al. (2016) also identified a
mixed picture, with relative decline in several Northern
cities in particular. Martin et al. (2014) found a negative
relationship between city size and output growth between
1981 and 2011 – in other words, smaller places fared better.
The existing evidence on older industrial Britain since the
recession points in the opposite direction: reviewing a range
of data up to 2014, the Industrial Communities Alliance
(2015) argued that older industrial areas were lagging
behind in the recovery.
A WORKING DEFINITION
In this paper we use the term ‘older industrial towns’ to
include all Britain’s older industrial areas beyond the
main regional cities. There is no official UK government
Table 1. Districts and unitary authorities covering ‘older industrial towns’.
North East Yorkshire & Humber Scotland
County Durham Barnsley Clackmannanshire
Darlington Bradford Dundee
Gateshead Calderdale East Ayrshire
Hartlepool Doncaster East Dunbartonshire
Middlesbrough Hull East Lothian
North Tyneside Kirklees East Renfrewshire
Redcar and Cleveland North East Lincolnshire Falkirk
South Tyneside North Lincolnshire Fife
Stockton on Tees Rotherham Inverclyde
Sunderland Wakefield Midlothian
North Ayrshire
North Lanarkshire
North West East Midlands Renfrewshire
Allerdale Amber Valley South Lanarkshire
Barrow in Furness Ashfield West Dunbartonshire
Blackburn with Darwen Bassetlaw West Lothian
Bolton Bolsover
Burnley Chesterfield
Bury Corby Wales
Chorley Erewash Blaenau Gwent
Copeland Gedling Bridgend
Halton Mansfield Caerphilly
Hyndburn Newark and Sherwood Carmarthenshire
Knowsley North East Derbyshire Flintshire
Oldham Merthyr Tydfil
Pendle Neath Port Talbot
Preston West Midlands Newport
Rochdale Dudley Rhondda Cynon Taf
Rossendale Newcastle under Lyme Swansea
Salford Sandwell Torfaen
Sefton Stoke on Trent Wrexham
South Ribble Walsall
St Helens Wolverhampton
Stockport
Tameside
Trafford
Warrington
Wigan
Wirral
Recovery or stagnation?: Britain’s older industrial towns since the recession 3
REGIONAL STUDIES
definition of these places, and a definition driven by a single
set of statistics is not possible. Table 1 lists the local
authority districts and unitary authorities used here for
statistical purposes. Districts and unitary authorities are
the smallest building block for which most of the key con-
temporary data are available.
The core of the list comprises the districts and unitary
authorities covering the UK’s former coalfields, the location
of so much of the UK’s early industrialization. Here we use
the labour market-based definition of the coalfields first
deployed in Beatty and Fothergill (1996), which covers
the places where the coal industry still accounted for 10%
or more of men in work in 1981, but the list excludes
four small coalfield areas in the Midlands and South
where economic recovery is known to have been firmly
entrenched by the early 2000s (Beatty, Fothergill, &
Powell, 2007). The additions to this core cover the
locations of job loss from the UK’s main steelworks, ship-
yards and concentrations of heavy engineering and chemi-
cals (Beatty & Fothergill, 2017). The list also includes the
former mill towns of Lancashire and West Yorkshire,
where the textile industry has all but disappeared. A
problem in applying a single statistical indicator at one
point in time is the timing of job loss: the main contraction
in the UK’s cotton and woollen textile industries occurred
in the 1950s and 1960s, and big job losses from shipbuild-
ing also date from this time, whereas the main job losses
from steel began in the 1970s and from other industries
rather later. A further complication is that much of the his-
torical data are not held on contemporary local authority
boundaries. We have also chosen to exclude the main
locations of the UK motor industry (where they do not
overlap with the location of other older industries) because
although the motor industry also experienced substantial
job losses it never approached terminal decline, unlike sev-
eral of the UK’s other industries, and since the 1990s has
actually experienced something of a revival. No definition
of ‘Britain’s older industrial towns’ can entirely exclude an
element of informed judgement and this needs to be kept
in mind in interpreting the data presented here.
Reflecting Britain’s distinctive industrial geography, the
districts and unitary authorities in Table 1 are all in the
Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales, where job losses
from older industries have long posed a problem for the
Figure 1. District and unitary authorities covering Britain’s older industrial towns.
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regional economy, and the list excludes the main regional
cities. In 2016, the local authorities listed in Table 1, and
mapped in Figure 1, had a combined population of 16.6
million, or 26% of the Great Britain (GB) total. Three
points are worth noting. First, some of these ‘towns’ are
actually substantial cities – Sunderland, Hull, Bradford,
Stoke and Swansea, for example. Second, several the local
authorities cover numerous quite small towns, especially
in former mining areas such as County Durham. Third,
some of the local authorities stray into rural territory just
as some of the obvious omissions (Northumberland is an
example) include sub-areas that are clearly older industrial
in character.
THE LABOUR MARKET ACCOUNTING
APPROACH
Labour market accounts are a tool that can be used disag-
gregate overall trends into several constituent flows.
Whereas it might be naively assumed that an increase in
the number of jobs in a locality will lead to a reduction in
local unemployment of the same magnitude, in fact the
labour market is a great deal more complex. Alongside
changes in labour demand there are simultaneous changes
in labour supply, some independent of labour demand,
others (commuting, for example) to a significant extent in
response to the availability of employment.
The use of labour market accounts to help understand
regional and local trends in the UK has a long history.
The Cambridge Economic Policy Group (1980, 1982)
first applied this approach to UK regions, highlighting
the interrelationship between employment growth and
migration. Begg, Moore, and Rhodes (1986) applied
labour market accounts to Britain’s cities over the period
1951–81, illustrating what was, at the time, an outflow of
both people and jobs. Turok and Edge (1999) used labour
market accounts to expose the serious job shortfall in cities
that had accumulated following years of deindustrialization
and recession. The approach has also been applied at the
sub-regional scale (Owen & Green, 1989; Green &
Owen, 1991).
In the former coalfields, labour market accounts showed
how the loss of coal jobs resulted in little or no increase in
recorded unemployment, in this instance because of a
diversion of working-age men into ‘economic inactivity’
(Beatty & Fothergill, 1996; Beatty et al., 2007). More
recently in the coalfields, labour market accounts have
demonstrated how there are growing interactions between
the male and female sides of local labour markets (Beatty,
2016). In seaside towns, labour market accounts have
shown how relatively high unemployment has coexisted
with surprisingly resilient employment, the key explanation
in this case being sustained in-migration (Beatty & Fother-
gill 2004).
A great advantage of labour market accounts is that the
components are all arithmetically related, so it is possible to
show how they work together to generate the overall pat-
tern of labour market change. There are several different
ways in which the accounts can be presented. The one fol-
lowed here is as follows:
Increase in the number of jobs
minus: Natural increase in the workforce
minus: Internal net in-migration
minus: International net in-migration
minus: Increase in net in-commuting
minus: Increase in economically active
equals: Reduction in recorded unemployment
In effect, this way of organizing the accounts deducts all the
increases in labour supply from the local increase in
employment to show the resulting reduction in local unem-
ployment. In the context of recent trends in Britain’s older
industrial towns, where recorded unemployment has been
falling, this way of arranging the accounts is particularly
helpful because it quantifies the trends that have under-
pinned the reduction. Falling unemployment may be the
result of local job growth, but equally it could have resulted
from a reduction in local labour supply.
Here we assemble labour market accounts for Britain’s
older industrial towns for the period from 2010 to 2016.
The period begins with the UK economy in deep recession
following the financial crisis and from around 2012
onwards covers a period of sustained if unspectacular econ-
omic growth. At the time of writing, 2016 is the most
recent year for which most of the relevant local economic
data is available. Whilst comparisons with the pre-2010
period might have been illuminating, the substantial
additional data assembly has precluded this option within
the present research.
The principal data source is the UK’s Annual Popu-
lation Survey (APS), which is a continuous national house-
hold survey incorporating the Labour Force Survey (LFS).
In 2016/7 the APS had a sample size of around 230,000, of
which around four-fifths were of working-age (16–64
years). The changes in the number of jobs, in recorded
unemployment and in economic activity rates are all
taken directly from this source. The change in net commut-
ing is the changing balance (positive or negative) between
the number of jobs in each district and the number of resi-
dents in employment, again from the APS. The number of
jobs in each area is the number of people who report a pri-
mary workplace in the area – this differs a little from the
total number of jobs in the area (because some people
have more than one job) and more substantially from the
number of residents in employment (because of commut-
ing). At the district scale, all APS data are affected by
sampling error, but by aggregating into larger groups of
towns the bigger sample sizes reduce the confidence inter-
vals and the estimates are broadly reliable. The alternative
source of workplace-based employment data, the UK’s
Business Register and Employment Survey, provides
more reliable figures for individual local areas such as dis-
tricts, but unlike the APS excludes the self-employed,
who these days make up well over 10% of the UK work-
force, and therefore cannot be combined in labour market
Recovery or stagnation?: Britain’s older industrial towns since the recession 5
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accounts alongside data that covers the workforce as a
whole.
The natural increase in the workforce aged 16–64 can-
not be measured directly and has been calculated by a
cohort survival model based on the age structure of the
local population in 2010, the numbers reaching the ages
of 16 or 65 by 2016, and deaths of working age. These
data are all from the UK’s Office for National Statistics
(ONS) or from National Records of Scotland.
In the labour market accounts presented here migration
is divided into two components: net migration internal to
the UK, and net migration from abroad. This is particularly
appropriate given the historically high level of international
migration to the UK in recent years (e.g., ONS, 2018a).
The accounts use the ONS figures on internal migration
by local authority, adjusted on the basis of GB data to
exclude migrants aged 0–15 and 65 plus. The ONS pro-
duces figures on net long-term (i.e., 12 months plus) inter-
national migration by local authority, drawing principally
on international passenger surveys. However, the ONS
notes that the recording of emigration from the UK by
international students is problematic (ONS, 2017), a
view confirmed by the statistics regulator (Office for Stat-
istics Regulation, 2017). In university cities and towns, in
particular, this is a potentially serious distortion. Addition-
ally, not all international migrants are of working age and
not all those of working age are necessarily engaged with
the labour market.
The labour market accounts require local-level esti-
mates of net international migration by economically active
working-age adults. Bearing in mind that the other
elements in the labour market accounts are all either direct
measurements from the APS, or the product of a reliable
model (natural increase), or longstanding ONS estimates
(internal migration), the most robust approach is to esti-
mate net international migration as the residual that arith-
metically balances the labour market accounts. For GB as a
whole between 2010 and 2016, this points to net inter-
national in-migration of economically active working-age
adults of 1.1 million. The ONS figure for all net inter-
national migration of working age over the same period is
1.4 million. Most, if not all, the difference will be attribu-
table to economically inactive migrants so in practice the
two figures are close. The estimation of net international
migration of economically active working-age adults as a
residual in the labour market accounts is not ideal. How-
ever, the local estimates used here are less likely to be dis-
torted by the difficulties in measuring the flows of
international students.
OLDER INDUSTRIAL TOWNS, 2010–16
Table 2 presents labour market accounts for Britain’s older
industrial towns for the period 2010–16. The first line
shows that the number of jobs in the towns increased by
220,000 over this six-year period. In absolute terms the
increase was from 6,170,000 in 2010 to 6,390,000 in
2016. This is the number of jobs located in the towns
(more specifically, the number of people recorded by the
APS as reporting a primary workplace in these towns),
not the number of residents in work.
The second line shows that the natural increase in the
workforce in Britain’s older industrial towns was actually
negative over these years. In other words, the sum of deaths
of working age and people reaching age 65 exceeded the
number of young people reaching age 16 – an excess of
190,000. What is noteworthy here is that the period
2010–16 spans the years when the large numbers born
immediately after the Second World War finally reached
state pension age.
The third line shows that the size of the workforce also
declined as a result of internal migration though the
reduction, at just 20,000, was not large. By contrast, over
this six-year period international migration (the fourth
line) increased the economically active working-age popu-
lation of the towns by 160,000. Both flows here are net, that
is, the balance between the numbers moving in and moving
out, and they cover just 16–64 year olds.
The negative figure in the accounts for commuting (the
fifth line) points to an increase in net out-commuting of
110,000. Commuting between areas has increased over
the years as travelling distances have risen, and net com-
muting is the balance between flows in each direction. In
2010, Britain’s older industrial towns had a net outward
flow of nearly 860,000 commuters; by 2016 this had
risen to 970,000.
The increase in the economic activity rate among men
and women of working age (the sixth line) added a further
120,000 to labour supply in older industrial towns. By
2016, just under 76% of all men and women of working
age (16–64) in the towns were ‘economically active’ in
that they were either in work or looking for work.
The final line in the accounts shows the reduction in
recorded unemployment. The figures here are the number
of men and women meeting the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) unemployment criteria used by the
UK’s LFS. To be ILO unemployed, a person has to be out
of work, to have looked for work in the last four weeks,
and to be available to start work within the next two
weeks. In the UK, the number of ILO unemployed is the
government’s preferred measure of unemployment and has
for some years substantially exceeded the ‘claimant count’
– the number claiming unemployment-related benefits. In
Britain’s older industrial towns, the ILO measure of
Table 2. Labour market accounts for older industrial towns,
2010–16.
n
Increase in the number of jobs 220,000
minus Natural increase in the workforce −190,000
minus Internal net in-migration −20,000
minus International net in-migration 160,000
minus Increase in net in-commuting −110,000
minus Increase in economic activity rate 120,000
equals Reduction in recorded unemployment 270,000
Sources: Annual Population Survey (APS), Office for National Statistics
(ONS) and authors’ estimates.
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unemployment fell by 270,000 between 2010 and 2016. In
2016, recorded unemployment in the towns stood at
440,000.
What the labour market accounts indicate is that over
this particular period the reduction in recorded unemploy-
ment in Britain’s older industrial towns (270,000) was
actually 50,000 greater than the growth in local employ-
ment (220,000). This was possible primarily because of
the excess of retirements over the numbers of young people
entering the workforce, and because of an increase in out-
commuting. Pushing in the other direction, boosting local
labour supply, was rising labour force participation and net
migration from abroad.
JOB QUALITY
One of the prominent worries about the recovery from
recession in the UK has been that the newly created jobs
have been biased towards low-wage, insecure employment.
For older industrial towns, the evidence from the APS is
mixed. ‘Self-employment’, for example, which can conceal
dubious employment practices, accounted for 11% of
employed residents in 2017 compared with 14% across
Britain as a whole. As a share of all jobs in the towns,
self-employment was up just 1 percentage point since
2010. Part-time employment, at 26% of jobs, was also
only marginally higher than the GB average and
unchanged from the share in 2010.
According to APS data, in 2017, 2.6 million people
across the UK as a whole were ‘underemployed’ in that
they wanted to work more hours – down on the peak
level of around 3.1 million during the recession, but higher
than the pre-recession figure of just below 2 million. A gov-
ernment survey of businesses puts the number of employees
on zero-hours contracts at 1.8 million, but APS data put
the 2017 total lower at 900,000, or 2.8% of all employment
(ONS, 2018b). The numbers have risen sharply since 2010,
but the ONS takes the view that a part of the observed
increase is due to increased recognition and awareness of
this form of employment. Around one-quarter of those
on zero-hours contracts would like more hours, mostly in
their current job, and across the UK as a whole APS data
show that, in 2017, 4% of workers had second jobs and
5% were in temporary employment.
In the absence of local data, the small national percen-
tages on zero-hours contracts, with second jobs or in tem-
porary employment, suggest that these are likely to be
relatively marginal features of the labour market in older
industrial towns, though that does not rule out the possi-
bility of increases since the pre-recession years.
However, two indicators do sharply differentiate older
industrial towns from other places. One is the continuing
reliance on industrial employment. In 2017, 14% of the
jobs in Britain’s older industrial towns were still in manu-
facturing, energy and water – almost twice the proportion
in the main regional cities and three times the proportion
in London. The other is the proportion of white-collar
jobs, which in 2017 accounted for just 39% of all jobs
in older industrial towns compared with 50% in the
main regional cities and 60% in London. The govern-
ment’s Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings shows
that, in 2017, the median gross weekly pay of employees
working in older industrial towns was 9% below the GB
average.
DIFFERENCES ACROSS THE COUNTRY
Table 3 presents labour market accounts for older indus-
trial towns in four parts of Britain: the Midlands,
North, Scotland and Wales. What is striking is the simi-
larity of the labour market trends in older industrial towns
in each of these parts of the country. Growth in the num-
ber of jobs, expressed as a percentage of the base year
working-age population, was in the narrow range of
1.1–2.4%. The reduction in recorded unemployment was
in an even narrower range between 2.4% and 2.9%.
Other labour market flows show only subtle differences
across the country. For example, Scotland’s older indus-
trial towns gained rather more from internal UK
migration, but rather less from international migration,
and Scotland appears to have lagged in terms of rising
economic activity rates.
Such modest differences should not, however, deflect
from the main observation, which is that, on the whole,
across the Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales, older
industrial towns shared broadly similar labour market
trends over this period.
Table 3. Labour market accounts for older industrial towns in different parts of Britain, 2010–16.
As a % of residents of working age
Midlands North Wales Scotland
Increase in the number of jobs 1.8 2.4 2.4 1.1
minus Natural increase in the workforce −1.5 −1.7 −2.5 −2.5
minus Internal net in-migration 0.1 −0.8 0.3 1.3
minus International net in-migration 2.0 1.8 1.4 0.4
minus Increase in net in-commuting −2.6 −0.6 −2.4 −0.4
minus Increase in economic activity rate 1.1 1.2 2.8 −0.6
equals Reduction in recorded unemployment 2.7 2.4 2.9 2.7
Sources: Annual Population Survey (APS), Office for National Statistics (ONS) and authors’ estimates.
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COMPARISONS WITH OTHER AREAS
Table 4 compares labour market accounts for Britain’s older
industrial towns with equivalent figures for themain cities in
their regions, for London (defined here as Greater London)
and for Britain as a whole. The 10 main regional cities here
are the local authorities at the core of larger metropolitan
areas that also include several older industrial towns.
Comparisons between absolute numbers are compro-
mised by differences in population – whereas the older
industrial towns have a combined population of 16.6
million, the main regional cities have a total of 5.6 million,
London has 8.8 million and the GB as a whole has 63.8
million. The labour market flows are therefore also
expressed as a percentage of the working-age population
in each area at the start of the period. Several important
points emerge from the comparisons:
. Between2010 and2016, recorded unemployment in older
industrial towns fell faster than the average across Britain,
at the same rate as in the main regional cities, yet over the
same period, the number of jobs in older industrial towns
grew substantiallymore slowly.As a percentage of the resi-
dent working-age population, the number of jobs in the
main regional cities grew more than three times faster
than in older industrial towns, and the job growth in
London was nearly seven times faster.
. The reduction in the workforce in older industrial towns
attributable to a negative natural increase was part of a
national GB trend, but not one shared by the main
regional cities or in particular by London.
. The small loss of the working-age population in older
industrial towns attributable to internal migration was
less than the equivalent losses from the main regional
cities and from London, but the increase attributable
to international migration was proportionally less than
in the main regional cities or in the GB as a whole,
and markedly less than in London.
. The increase in out-commuting from older industrial
towns (110,000) was not counterbalanced by an equival-
ent increase in commuting into the main regional cities
(just 20,000).
. The increase in economic activity rates over this period
added proportionally less to the workforce in older
industrial towns than to the national average and in par-
ticular to London.
In summary, the labour market trends in older indus-
trial towns differ in important ways from trends in the cities
and the national average. Despite the above-average
reduction in recorded unemployment in older industrial
towns, several of the other trends, notably the growth in
local employment, are distinctly less positive.
RELATIONSHIP TO REGIONAL CITIES
A large number of older industrial towns are located in the
immediate hinterland of the main regional cities, whileTa
b
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others are located further afield and therefore less likely to
be connected to the cities by commuting flows. On the
grouping used here, some 11.9 million of the 16.6 million
people in Britain’s older industrial towns live in the hinter-
lands of the main regional cities. Some of these towns are
sufficiently close to the main regional cities to be integral
parts of the same labour market (e.g., Salford in relation
to Manchester); others are further afield, within commut-
ing distance, but also with a significant degree of physical
and economic separation (e.g., Doncaster in relation to
Sheffield).
Table 5 compares labour market accounts for older
industrial towns in city hinterlands with equivalent figures
for older industrial towns further afield. If proximity to a
major city is an important determinant of growth, it should
be evident in these figures. In fact, job growth between
2010 and 2016 was virtually the same in towns close to
the cities as in towns further afield and there was little
difference too in the reduction in recorded unemployment.
The labour market links between cities and their neigh-
bouring towns are nevertheless very real and powerful. In
2016, net commuting out of the older industrial towns in
the cities’ hinterlands totalled 920,000, equivalent to 18%
of all residents in employment. Not all this commuting
will have been into the main regional cities, of course, but
this particular figure is a net flow – the daily flow outwards
will be significantly larger, offset in part by in-commuting.
Looking at commuting flows from the other direction,
in 2016 the 10 main regional cities covered here had a net
in-flow of 910,000 commuters, equivalent to 27% of all the
jobs located in these cities. In the cities where the boundary
is drawn tightly the proportion is higher still: 37% in New-
castle upon Tyne, 39% in Nottingham and 45% in Man-
chester. The figures are lower for Leeds (14%) and
Sheffield (10%) where the city boundaries are drawn
more inclusively.
The experience of individual cities and their hinterlands
does, however, seem to have varied. It is difficult to be pre-
cise because for individual places the APS data on changes
in net commuting is subject to a larger sampling error.
However, Manchester, Edinburgh and Cardiff appear to
have experienced a marked increase in net in-commuting
between 2010 and 2016, balanced by a large increase in
net out-commuting from surrounding older industrial
towns. Elsewhere, the changes in commuting appear to
have been more complex.
THE ROLE OF LONDON
Although London is some distance from nearly all Britain’s
older industrial towns, its huge and dynamic labour market
might still be expected to exert an important influence.
This is less likely to be felt through commuting patterns
(though there are unquestionably Monday-to-Friday
flows from long distance into London) than through its
impact on migration. Table 6 therefore compares labour
market accounts for three parts of Britain: London, the
three regions making up the rest of the South (South
East, South West and East) and the rest of the country,
which includes all the older industrial towns under con-
sideration here.
London’s labour market dynamics over the 2010–16
period are truly astonishing. The number of jobs in London
grew by 800,000, at a pace four times faster than in the rest
of the South or in the rest of Britain. London also experi-
enced a vast net inflow of economically active adults of
working age from abroad (an estimated 530,000), a surge
in net in-commuting (up 150,000), a big increase in labour
supply from rising economic activity rates (an extra
250,000) and a natural increase in its workforce (80,000)
that reflects a population structure skewed towards younger
groups.
The relevant question here is whether any of this spec-
tacular growth spilled over into the labour markets of the
Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales, where Britain’s
older industrial towns are to be found.
Internal migration is the key variable. It might have
been expected that London’s employment growth would
have attracted workers from the rest of the country. In
fact, though London did experience net in-migration,
this was entirely attributable to international migration.
The internal migration flow (i.e., the flow of UK residents)
Table 5. Labour market accounts for older industrial towns in
city hinterlands and more remote locations, 2010–16.
As a % of residents of
working age
City
hinterlands
More
remote
Increase in the number
of jobs
2.1 2.0
minus Natural increase in the
workforce
−1.7 −2.3
minus Internal net in-
migration
0.0 −0.7
minus International net in-
migration
1.4 2.1
minus Increase in net in-
commuting
−1.3 −0.7
minus Increase in economic
activity rate
1.1 1.1
equals Reduction in recorded
unemployment
2.6 2.4
Note: The older industrial districts included here in the city hinterlands are:
Birmingham: Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton; Cardiff: Blae-
nau Gwent, Bridgend, Caerphilly, Merthyr Tydfil, Newport, Rhondda Cynon
Taf and Torfaen; Edinburgh: East Lothian, Midlothian and West Lothian;
Glasgow: East Ayrshire, East Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, Inver-
clyde, North Ayrshire, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, South Lanarkshire
and West Dunbartonshire; Leeds: Bradford, Calderdale, Kirklees and Wake-
field; Liverpool: Halton, Knowsley, Sefton, St Helens and Wirral; Manche-
ster: Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside,
Trafford and Wigan; Newcastle upon Tyne: County Durham, Gates-
head, North Tyneside, South Tyneside and Sunderland; Nottingham: Ash-
field, Erewash, Gedling, Mansfield, and Newark and Sherwood; and
Sheffield: Barnsley, Bassetlaw, Bolsover, Chesterfield, Doncaster, North
East Derbyshire and Rotherham.
Sources: Annual Population Survey (APS), Office for National Statistics
(ONS) and authors’ estimates.
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was actually strongly out of London – a net outflow in
excess of 300,000, and the corresponding net inflow was
nearly all to the rest of the South of England, which
suggests that it was strongly driven by the availability and
cost of housing. This meant that, taken as a group, the
Midlands, North, Scotland and Wales neither gained nor
lost from internal migration. Likewise, but less surpris-
ingly, the increase net in-commuting into London was
almost exclusively from the rest of Southern England.
In effect, the figures demonstrate that over the 2010–16
period, London’s impressive job growth was largely
detached from the labour market north of a line from the
Severn Estuary to theWash. There was little or no spillover
via commuting or migration. This confirms an earlier
observation relating to the pre-recession years (Rowthorn,
2010) that the net flow of internal migrants into London
and the South of England has essentially come to a halt.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
Over the 2010–16 period, international migration of work-
ing age was a major feature of the UK labour market. The
figures in the labour market accounts put the net inflow of
economically active working-age migrants to Britain at 1.1
million.
Turning to the impact on older industrial towns, two
comparisons stand out. First, though net international
migration into the towns provided a substantial boost to
labour supply (an estimated 160,000), it failed to offset
fully the negative natural increase in the local workforce
(190,000) arising from the excess of retirements and deaths
over the number of young people reaching working age.
Second, at 160,000, the net international migration of
economically active working-age adults was equivalent to
roughly three-quarters of the net job growth in older indus-
trial towns over the same period (220,000).
It is very unlikely, however, that all the new jobs in older
industrial towns would have been created in the absence of
international migration.Workers from abroad have probably
allowed some firms to expand more than would otherwise
have been the case by filling skill shortages or, in at least
some cases, by providing a source of cheap labour. On the
other hand, in the context of older industrial towns with per-
sistent unemployment, especially during the earlier part of
the decade, it is questionable just how much firms’ growth
would have been constrained by labour supply.
Britain’s older industrial towns have not, however, been
the prime destination for international in-migrants. Rather
this has been London, which over the 2010–16 period
accounted for almost half of all working-age net inter-
national migration to the UK. Again, there are two key
statistical observations. First, at 530,000, net international
migration by economically active working age adults
increased London’s working-age population by almost
10% in just six years. Second, at 530,000, this net inter-
national migration was equivalent to two-thirds of the
quite spectacular growth in London’s employment over
this period (800,000).
Again, it is impossible to tell how much of this job
growth in London would have happened in the absence
of international migration. However, in London, where
labour has generally been in shorter supply than in older
industrial towns, it is reasonable to assume that in the
absence of international migration more firms would have
been constrained by labour supply.
What, then, would have been the knock-on impact on
older industrial towns if this huge international inflow to
London had not occurred? It is impossible to be certain,
but if London had still generated substantial numbers of
new jobs, these might have attracted more internal
Table 6. Labour market accounts for London and the rest of Britain, 2010–16.
London Rest of South Rest of Great Britain
n
As a % of
working age n
As a % of
working age n
As a % of
working age
Increase in the number
of jobs
800,000 14.5 460,000 3.7 740,000 3.5
minus Natural increase in the
workforce
80,000 1.5 −240,000 −1.9 −420,000 −2.0
minus Internal net in-
migration
−320,000 −5.7 300,000 2.4 30,000 0.1
minus International net in-
migration
530,000 9.5 140,000 1.1 430,000 2.0
minus Increase in net in-
commuting
150,000 2.7 −130,000 −1.1 −10,000 −0.1
minus Increase in economic
activity rate
260,000 4.6 200,000 1.6 230,000 1.1
equals Reduction in recorded
unemployment
100,000 1.8 200,000 1.6 490,000 2.3
Sources: Annual Population Survey (APS), Office for National Statistics (ONS) and authors’ estimates.
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migrants from within the UK, including from older indus-
trial towns. The labour market accounts confirm that Lon-
don’s rapid job growth since 2010 has not resulted in a net
flow of migrants from the North, Midlands, Scotland and
Wales, which is consistent with the earlier evidence from
Rowthorn (2010) that international migration into
London and the South has been the key factor in curtailing
internal migration from the rest of the UK.
CONCLUSIONS
The labour market accounts provide a complex picture of
recent trends, but four general points emerge from this
evidence:
. The reduction in recorded unemployment since 2010
paints an overly positive picture of trends in Britain’s
older industrial towns. It hides the fact that the number
of jobs in older industrial towns has been growing only
slowly, that out-commuting from the towns has
increased further from an already high base and that
the increase in labour force participation has lagged
behind the national average. The labour market
accounts do not portray the economy of Britain’s older
industrial towns as having bounced back strongly from
the post-2008 recession, let alone from preceding years
of industrial job loss.
. The labour market in Britain’s older industrial towns is
deeply embedded with neighbouring cities and places
further afield. This is evidenced by large commuting
flows, but also by other trends that can only be explained
by reference to the role that older industrial towns play
in the wider UK urban system. For example, the nega-
tive natural increase in the workforce in older industrial
towns, in contrast to growth in London and the main
regional cities, reflects age structures that have been
shaped by years of selective migration.
. The improvement in the labour market in Britain’s older
industrial towns since 2010 does not seem to have been
especially dependent on neighbouring cities. Across the
towns as a whole there is little evidence that proximity to
one of the main regional cities has led to faster growth in
employment or bigger reductions in unemployment. As a
general rule, Britain’s older industrial towns tend to share
similar labour market trends wherever they are located.
. There is scant evidence that London’s spectacular
employment growth since 2010 has had a positive impact
on the labour market in Britain’s older industrial towns.
The Exchequer may have gained from London’s growth,
and there may therefore have been fiscal and macroeco-
nomic benefits to the Midlands, North, Scotland and
Wales, but the labour market accounts show that the
direct benefits of job growth in London have been con-
fined to London and surrounding parts of the South.
In effect, labour market trends in Britain’s older indus-
trial towns since the recession confirm neither assumptions
of self-correcting economic growth nor fears of ongoing
local decline. The best assessment is perhaps that there is
persistence in the longer term labour market problems in
these places. Just as the 2008 recession was not the under-
lying cause of their economic weakness, recovery from the
recession has not marked a turn-around in their relative
position in the UK economy.
It is possible to speculate why the post-recession recov-
ery in Britain’s older industrial towns has been sluggish,
though the labour market accounts themselves do not pin-
point why. One likely reason is that the economies of the
towns remain strongly reliant on manufacturing whereas
the UK’s post-recession upturn once more mirrored the
service-led model of earlier years, driven by rising house-
hold spending and debt rather than an improvement in
the UK’s balance of trade. A second likely reason is the con-
tinuing policy emphasis on the big cities, which have con-
tinued to draw in public sector investment, especially into
London. A third likely reason is simply that the industrial
job loss of earlier years has cast a very long shadow, with
downward adjustments in local spending power and indeed
in population (relative to other areas) that have counter-
acted positive progress in reviving local economies.
The implication of this assessment – in the UK and
elsewhere if this experience offers any guide – is that inter-
ventions to support growth and jobs in older industrial
towns are likely to remain an important claim on policy-
making for some years to come. In principle, an effective
approach is likely to require a rebalancing of national econ-
omic growth towards the sectors, particularly manufactur-
ing, that remain key components of the economy of older
industrial towns, combined with a range of public spending
and financial incentives in the towns that make them
attractive to potential investors.
Whether the low recorded unemployment in Britain’s
older industrial towns, the rapid growth of employment
in London and the high level of international in-migration
to the UK can be sustained is another matter. Beyond the
period covered here, the UK’s departure from the European
Union looms large not only over the UK economy as a
whole but also over the older industrial towns where so
much of what remains of UK manufacturing is located.
There is a very good case for revisiting the data presented
here in, say, 2022 or 2023, when a different national econ-
omic context might have led to different local labour mar-
ket trends.
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